

Adversarial AI in ICT

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TNO innovation
for life

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TNO: Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research



Connecting people and knowledge




Creating innovations



Sustainably strengthening business competitiveness



Sustainably strengthening well-being across society




AI poses new type of security problem in ICT

- Situation
 - **AI (to be) used everywhere**
 - E.g., image recognition in self driving cars; advanced network management
- Complication
 - **AI systems can become targets on their own**
 - E.g., wrongly recognized object; cyberattack misclassified as benign traffic
- **No systematic solution as of now**
 - Most research in image recognition, little in ICT/cloud use cases




Authentic Input



Adversarial Perturbation



Adversarial Input




TNO projects related to AI security in ICT context

- ADVICE – Adversarial AI in ICT
 - Jointly with NCIA as strategic partner, part of TNO appl.ai multi-year programme
 - Identification of adversarial scenarios in various phases of ICT infra lifecycle
- FNS – Future Network Services
 - TNO leads ecosystem of 60 partners working on 6G, sponsored by Dutch govt.
 - AI-based generation of 6G configs and software as one of the tasks
 - Reach-out to standardization
- Red Teaming AI
 - Internal TNO knowledge building project
 - Ethically attacking your own AI systems to find vulnerabilities




Adversarial scenarios in ICT infrastructure lifecycle

- We model lifecycle using “Days” structure (see [ETSI_NFV022],[ETSI_OSM])
 - Day 0: Design and plan
 - Day 1: Deployment
 - Day 2: Operations and maintenance
- For each Day, enumerate specific Tasks
 - Example: Day 0, Task 1: Understand strategic/business goals that the ICT system will fulfill
- For each Task, identify AI technique that can be used to fulfill it
 - Example (cnt’d): use LLM as idea generator/sparring partner




Adversarial scenarios in ICT infrastructure lifecycle

- Next, for each AI technique, identify **adversarial** AI technique
- Example (cont'd):
 - AI: use LLM
 - **AdvAI: Data extraction**
- Attempt to assess 'risk index' (RI) using e.g., CVSS4
- Consider mitigation measures, both:
 - 'classic' e.g., access control
 - AI-specific e.g., prompt sanitizing




Proof-of-Concept

- Part of the results being integrated in ETSI SAI WI-011
“Security aspects of using AI/ML techniques in telecom sector”
- One selected scenario worked-out as proof-of-concept
 - Day 2: Operations and maintenance
 - Task(s):
 - Reasoning, events analysis,
 - Course-of-Action execution
 - AI: LLM + tooling
 - error msg in, explanation out
 - agency: explanation is actionable
 - AdvAI: Prompt manipulation/AI-supply chain attack
 - **Not** detectable by current malware analysers etc.



Proof-of-Concept scenario

- Human Cloud Operator deploys various services in edge/tactical cloud
- Kubernetes as cloud operating system
- AI Assistant provides troubleshooting capabilities
 - Analysis and explanation (Llama + k8sgpt)
 - Taking action, based on above analysis (TNO)
- However, AI Assistant is also new attack surface
 - Adversary poisons software update
 - Malicious instructions reach AI Assistant
 - Classis antivirus cannot detect this threat



Next steps: make AI in ICT more secure

- Plans for 2025:
 1. Detecting attacks against AI in ICT context
 2. (Semi-autonomous) mitigation and response to detected attacks
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