TNO innovation for life

DETECTING TRANSACTION FRAUD WITH MULTI-PARTY COMPUTATION

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JOINT WORK

Secure multiparty PageRank algorithm for collaborative fraud detection

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THE MULTIPARTY COMPUTATION PARADOX

Information Sharing
Collaboration



Privacy
Confidentiality

TOY EXAMPLE DATING

THE MULTIPARTY COMPUTATION PARADOX

Second date??



Rejection??

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JnmESTrsQbg

FRAUD DETECTION

FRAUD WAS INDIVIDUAL





FRAUD HAS BECOME ORGANIZED

- Europol: *"Organized crime is more connected and internationally active than ever before."*

How a financial cybercrime group is organized

Kaspersky Lab is actively investigating five large, Russian-speaking cybercriminal groups involved in stealing money using malicious software.



The Money flow manager transfe s provided by the Money mules manager. The Money mules manager instructs the money mules where to transfer the money. A share of the stolen money ends up with the Head of the money mules service, while the rest is transferred to the Leader of the criminal group.

DETECTING FRAUD BY IDENTIFYING SUSPICIOUS MONEY FLOWS



Nodes: Bank accounts

Links: Transactions

Additional properties per link:

- Number of transactions
- Total amount of money transferred
- …

For a given time interval

Graph Analytics for Real-time Scoring of Cross-channel Transactional Fraud

Ian Molloy[1], Suresh Chari[1], Ulrich Finkler[1], Mark Wiggerman[2], Coen Jonker[2], Ted Habeck[1], Youngja Park[1], Frank Jordens[2], and Ron van Schaik[2]

[1] IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center
[2] ABN AMRO Bank N.V.

Abstract. We present a new approach to cross channel fraud detection: build graphs representing transactions from all channels and use analytics on features extracted from these graphs. Our underlying hypothesis is *community based fraud detection*: an account (holder) performs normal or trusted transactions within a community that is "local" to the account. We explore several notions of community based on graph prop-

FEATURES INVESTIGATED



- **Shortest Path**
  distance between debit and credit
- **Strongly connected components**
  financial 'communities'
- **PageRank**
  Trust score for an account…
  used by Google to rank search results.

PAGERANK IS A CENTRALITY MEASURE





MONEY FLOW INFORMATION IS DISPERSED OVER MULTIPLE BANKS



Total network



Network per bank



Network seen by blue bank

THE MULTIPARTY COMPUTATION PARADOX

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Collaboration



Privacy
Confidentiality

THE MPC PARADOX – RESOLVED

Information Sharing
Collaboration

Conclusion

MPC

Privacy
Confidentiality

MULTI-PARTY COMPUTATION
A CRYPTOGRAPHIC SOLUTION

JOINT COMPUTATION WITH A TRUSTED PARTY



JOINT COMPUTATION WITH A TRUSTED PARTY



SECURE MULTI-PARTY COMPUTATION



- *Privacy*
  - Private inputs remain private
- *Correctness*
  - Output is guaranteed to be correct

MPC AND BLOCKCHAIN
TWO CRYPTOGRAPHIC TECHNOLOGIES TO DECENTRALIZE

- Both alternatives for *trusted third parties (TTP)*
- MPC focusses on disintermediation and establishes *confidentiality*
- Blockchain focusses on disintermediation and establishes *data integrity* and *non-repudiation*



HISTORY OF MPC

First MPC protocols

Asymptotic complexities

1980 1990 2000 2010

Feasibility questions

Practical applicability

MANY DIFFERENT MPC TECHNIQUES

- (Fully) homomorphic encryption
  - *Computation on encrypted data*
- Garbled circuits
  - *Encrypted Boolean Circuits*
- Secret sharing
  - *Dividing a secret S into various shares*





A ‘toolbox’ of cryptographic techniques, but no one-size-fits-all solution

THE CHALLENGES OF APPLYING MPC

- Technological
  - *What are the theoretical limitations of MPC?*
  - *What is the optimal MPC protocol for this specific solution?*
  - *What ad-hoc efficiency improvements can we make?*
- Legal
  - *Does MPC comply with privacy legislation?*
- Ethical
  - *Do we want to create this functionality in all cases?*

COLLABORATION IS REQUIRED TO ANALYSE THE COMBINED TRANSACTION NETWORK



- Three different parties: A, B, C

- Party A only sees the blue transactions:



- Challenge: how can we compute the PageRank of each node?
- Solution:
  - ~~Trusted third party~~
  - Secure multi-party computation

CRYPTOGRAPHIC BUILDING BLOCK
HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION



PROTOCOL ARCHITECTURE

Key generation:

- Centralized. Provide a public key and partial private keys.

Initialization:

- Collaboratively compute n (total number of nodes).

Secure PageRank:

- Only share encrypted PageRank contributions and values at each PageRank iteration.

Partial Decrypt & Combine:

- Collaboratively decrypt the PageRank values with partial decryptions.



CONCLUSION

- MPC allows banks to
  - Collaboratively analyse transaction networks
  - Without sharing private data
- Only the output of the computation is revealed by the protocol
- The protocol eliminates the need for a trusted-third party
- An implementation is readily available


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