

1 **Future European shale gas life cycle greenhouse gas emissions for electric**
2 **power generation in comparison to other fossil fuels**

3
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9
10 **ABSTRACT**
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12 The carbon footprint of shale gas combusted in Europe was estimated from nine European
13 shale gas plays as potential production regions. Greenhouse gas emission sources during
14 shale gas production, such as fugitives from hydraulic fracturing or combustion emissions
15 from horizontal drilling, were added to emissions occurring for conventional gas extraction.
16 Greenhouse gas emissions are expressed as kg CO₂-equivalents per MJ delivered, and calcu-
17 lated for a kWh of electricity generated. Estimated total GHG emissions from the use of
18 European shale gas for electricity production range from 0.42 to 0.75 kg CO₂-eq/kWh when
19 the combustion in the power plant is included. This is within the range reported in the literature.
20 The cumulative carbon footprints for a number of fossil electricity generation scenarios
21 for Europe were also calculated. The results indicate an advantage of gas over other
22 fossil sources in a wide range of scenarios. These results are only reversed with very high
23 (10%) upstream losses for shale gas. With the current knowledge there is still a substantial
24 climate benefit of replacing coal with (shale) gas even in the EU reference scenario.
25

26 **Keywords:** shale gas, carbon footprint, EU reference scenario, electricity generation

27 **Introduction**

28 Shale gas source rocks are widely distributed around the world and many countries have now
29 started to investigate their shale gas potential. Some argue that shale gas has already proven
30 to be a game changer in the U.S. energy market (EIA, 2015), where its contribution to elec-
31 tricity generation exceeded that of coal for the first time in 2016 (EIA, 2017). The European
32 Commission's Energy Roadmap 2050 (EC, 2011) identifies gas as a critical energy source for
33 the transformation of the energy system to a system with lower CO₂ emissions by combining
34 gas with increasing contributions of renewable energy and increasing energy efficiency. It
35 may be argued that in Europe, natural gas replacing coal and oil will contribute to emissions
36 reduction on the short and medium term. Greenhouse gas emissions for electricity generation
37 from gas are generally lower than those from oil and coal due to a more beneficial heat per
38 carbon density and higher combustion efficiencies (e.g. IPCC, 2011). This advantage has
39 been confirmed in many life cycle assessments for the United States (Burnham et al., 2012;
40 Dale et al., 2013; Heath et al., 2014a; Hultman et al., 2011; Jiang et al., 2011; Laurenzi & Jer-
41 sey, 2013; Stephenson et al., 2013; Cooper et al., 2016) and China (Chang et al., 2015) even
42 when using imported gas (Raj et al., 2016). However, uncertainty remains on the losses of
43 methane to the atmosphere during production and transport of gas (Heath et al., 2014b; Jiang
44 et al., 2011). Since methane is a more powerful greenhouse gas than CO₂, this uncertainty has
45 led to the postulation that this leakage might offset the advantage of gas over coal during
46 combustion (Howarth et al., 2011; Wigley, 2011). Estimations of the trade-off point where
47 life cycle GHG emissions of electricity from gas would be higher than those from coal due to
48 upstream emissions range from 3%-15% of production volumes (e.g. Sanchez and Mays,
49 2015; Howarth et al., 2012; Qin et al., 2017). Part of the variation in estimations can be ex-
50 plained by differences in system boundaries and assumptions on power plant efficiencies.
51 Next to life cycle approaches, another way of assessing emissions is by measuring around

52 and/or over a large production area and establishing an integrated overall source strength (e.g.
53 Peischl et al., 2015; 2016; Johnson et al., 2017; Karion et al., 2015). Literature suggests dis-
54 crepancies between emission inventory estimates based on activity data multiplied with emis-
55 sion factors and integrated overall source strength approaches for the oil and gas sector in the
56 US may be in the order of 50-100% (Miller, et al., 2013; Moore, et al., 2014; Alvarez et al.,
57 2018).

58 Most studies concerned with the life cycle greenhouse gas emissions of shale gas ex-
59 ploitation and use were conducted for the United States. Questions are raised about the spe-
60 cific environmental footprint of shale gas in Europe as a whole as well as in individual Mem-
61 ber States. Few studies attempted to translate the U.S. based knowledge to the European con-
62 ditions (Broderick et al., 2011; Foster & Perks, 2012), or perform a life cycle assessment
63 based on U.S. experiences and few explorative measurements (Stamford & Azapagic, 2014;
64 Tagliaferri et al., 2017; Mackay & Stone, 2013). Others (e.g. Mackay & Stone, 2013;
65 McGlade et al., 2014) have assessed the potential of shale gas contribution to global green-
66 house gas emissions reductions in the short and medium term, taking into consideration also
67 indirect effects on coal use, e.g. via gas prices and export. None of them investigated how the
68 total fossil carbon footprint of electricity generation in various European countries would
69 change if shale gas was to replace other fossil sources.

70 Within the context of the European H2020 project M4 shale (Measuring, Monitoring,
71 Mitigating and Managing the environmental impact of shale gas), the aim of our research was
72 to estimate the carbon footprint of shale gas exploitation and combustion for electricity gen-
73 eration in Europe based on existing knowledge and models. We also compare the carbon
74 footprints from fossil electricity generation with and without shale gas for Europe as a whole
75 and for individual countries. For this purpose, the life cycle assessment model GHGenius was
76 applied and extended with literature data on emissions related to shale gas operations, and

77 several scenarios were developed for the potential use of shale gas in Europe taking the EU
78 reference scenario as a starting point.

79 **Materials and Method**

80 Several modelling steps were combined to arrive at a comparison of carbon footprints in sce-
81 narios. First, carbon footprints of fuel delivery to Europe were derived, then carbon footprints
82 from electricity generation were calculated and finally these were combined in a scenario
83 comparison. An overview of the approach and the system boundaries is shown in Figure 1.

84 *Upstream Carbon Footprint Modelling*

85 Carbon Footprints of shale gas were modelled in two steps: First, upstream GHG emissions
86 per MJ delivered to and from four European regions North, Central, Southeast and Southwest
87 EU (see Table S1 for country allocation) were estimated. Second, emissions from electricity
88 generation were calculated for every European country. Methane and CO₂ were taken into ac-
89 count as greenhouse gasses. To transfer fossil methane emissions to kg CO₂-equivalents (eq),
90 a GWP of 30 was applied (IPCC, 2013).

91 Estimations of emissions from delivering one MJ of conventional gas and oil to Euro-
92 pean regions using GHGenius are given by (S&T)² Consultants Inc. (2013a,b) and COWI
93 (2015). In short, these upstream emissions are the sum of several fugitive (E_f) and combustive
94 (E_e) emission sources from production, processing and transport:

$$95 \quad E_{up,i} = \sum_j E_{prod,e,j} \cdot f_{ji} + \sum_j E_{prod,f,j} \cdot f_{ji} + \sum_j E_{proc,e,j} \cdot f_{ji} + \sum_j E_{proc,f,j} \cdot f_{ji} +$$
$$96 \quad \sum_j E_{proc,v,j} \cdot f_{ji} + \sum_j E_{trans,e,j} \cdot f_{ji} \cdot d_{ji} + \sum_j E_{trans,f,j} \cdot f_{ji}$$

97

98 Where $E_{up,i}$ are the emissions (gCO₂-equivalent) related to a GJ of gas delivered to
99 country i; Note that country j can also be the same as country i. $E_{prod,e,i}$ and $E_{prod,f,i}$ are the pro-
100 duction emissions from energy use and fugitives in country j (g CO₂-eq per GJ of gas pro-
101 duced); f_{ji} is the contribution of gas from country j to the supply in country i; $E_{proc,e,i}$; $E_{proc,f,i}$
102 $E_{proc,v,i}$ are the energy use, fugitive and vented emissions from gas produced in country i (g
103 CO₂-eq per GJ of gas produced); $E_{trans,e,j}$ are the emissions from energy use for pipeline trans-
104 mission (g CO₂-eq/km) and d_{ji} transport distances from country j to country i (km); $E_{trans,f,i}$,
105 are the fugitive emissions from transport in country j (g CO₂-eq per GJ of gas transported).
106 Emissions from energy use are calculated by multiplying the amount of fuel used by an emis-
107 sion factor and summing over the fuels. Emissions factors can be found in the Supporting In-
108 formation (Table S5).

109

110 Footprints of electricity generation from coal were described by Hauck et al. (2015,
111 see Supplementary Information for more details), which built on the methodology described
112 by (S&T)² Consultants Inc. (2013a,b) and COWI (2015) . Upstream emission factors for oil
113 shale which is used in Estonia have been taken from Siirde et al. (2013), the only sources that
114 does not rely on national energy balances and IPCC factors, possibly leading to minor dis-
115 crepancies between the studies. All of these studies cover full extraction, processing (if nec-
116 essary) and transportation. The system boundaries are also represented in Figure 1.

117 *Shale gas*

118 Realistic data for shale gas future operations in Europe are scarce or non-existent as only few
119 explorative drillings have taken place (Cooper et al., 2016). In particular, total production
120 from a well, an important parameter to estimate emissions per unit output, is currently un-

121 known. In general, and for our modelling exercise, it is assumed that production and pro-
122 cessing of shale gas is not fundamentally different from conventional gas, except for extra ac-
123 tivities that are required, especially for (pre-) production of the gas. Activities before actual
124 start of production like well preparation are referred to as pre-production. As summarized by
125 e.g. Moore et al. (2014) extra activities are mainly more and additional drilling (horizontal
126 next to vertical) and (more) hydraulic fracturing during well completion and potentially re-
127 fracturing during the well lifetime. Once gas is injected in high pressure transmission pipe-
128 lines, no distinction can be made between shale gas and conventional gas. Based hereupon,
129 for all life cycle stages except pre-production and production, GHG emissions were assumed
130 equal to those of conventional natural gas (see calculations above). Extra emissions sources
131 during production were added, following the reasoning in earlier life cycle assessments (Bro-
132 derick et al., 2011; Qin et al., 2017; Tagliaferri et al., 2017).

133 Data used to estimate shale gas production in Europe and additional emissions are de-
134 scribed below. The composition of raw gas and pipeline gas was set to fit European average
135 conditions based on a compilation by TNO (Costa et al., 2016, Visschedijk et al, 2018) and
136 Altfeld and Schley (2012). The same compositions were assumed for shale gas as for conven-
137 tional gas from the same country. Emissions from the construction of infrastructure for gas
138 exploitation were not included. For all EU countries, the same consumption mix of shale gas
139 was assumed: proportional to reserve size.

140 *Shale gas reserves*

141 The selection of shale gas plays, geologically similar areas where shale gas accumulation is
142 proven or postulated, was taken from Visschedijk et al. (2018). They identified nine major
143 shale gas plays in seven EU Member States. Maximum production (expected ultimate recov-

144 ery) per play was based on estimated technically recoverable reserves by EIA (2013). The ar-
145 eas of the plays were calculated in Visschedijk et al. (2018) using GIS and play contours by
146 EIA (2013). The estimated surface areas and reserves are shown in Table 1. Based on the area
147 per play shown in Table 1 and on the assumption that one well pad covers 25km² (a 5 x 5 km
148 square) and that 25 (20-30) wells are drilled in one pad (Cremonese, 2016) the required num-
149 ber of wells per play was deduced.

150 *Additional emissions during shale gas production*

151 Additional emission sources occurring during shale gas production and not occurring during
152 conventional gas production have been added based on Broderick et al. (2011). An overview
153 of the values used is given in Table 2. All energy use and emissions are modelled per unit of
154 gas produced. Added emission sources include the following processes:

- 155 • *Extra fuel use during production due to horizontal drilling:* These were modelled
156 as the product of the drilling width and the use of diesel per meter drilled.
- 157 • *Extra fuel use during production for hydraulic fracturing:* These were modelled
158 based on an average diesel use for one hydraulic fracturing event (Broderick et al.
159 2011). The total fuel use depends on the number of (re-) fracturing events. All
160 wells are fractured once for startup of the production and it was assumed that 50%
161 of the wells are re-fractured once during their lifetime (Broderick et al., 2011).
162 The extra diesel use per well was calculated as the product of the diesel use per
163 hydraulic fracturing and the number of (re-) fracturing events.
- 164 • *Extra fuel use due to transport of water and chemicals during production:* Total
165 volumes and distances transported per (re-)fracturing event was derived from Bro-
166 derick et al. (2011). These were multiplied by the diesel use per tkm of transport

167 taken from ecoinvent (Spielmann et al., 2007). Ecoinvent is a widely used Euro-
168 pean life cycle inventory data base, recently updated by Wernet et al., (2016).
169 • *Extra fugitive emissions from well completion and workovers (fracturing and*
170 *flowback)*: Broderick et al. (2011) report that a range of 0.6%-3.2% of total pro-
171 duction could leak during flowback, based on Howarth (2011). They also report
172 ranges of absolute production volumes per well as fugitive emission volumes.
173 From the emission range given by Broderick et al. (2011) we took 300,000m³ per
174 well lifetime as a representative number and divide it by the geometric mean of
175 the absolute production to arrive at an intermediate leakage rate of 0.77% of pro-
176 duction. This value is at the lower end of the range given by Howarth (2011). This
177 choice seemed justified by the fact that Howarths estimates have been criticized to
178 focus on the high end (Cathles, 2012) and were identified as much higher than
179 even the next highest values reported by others by MacKay & Stone (2013).

180 *Calculation of emissions from electricity generation*

181 The total carbon footprint of electricity generation in one country from one fuel was calcu-
182 lated as the sum of the upstream emissions of that fuel delivered to the European region the
183 country belongs to, and the emissions from electricity generation from that fuel in that coun-
184 try. Emissions from the distribution of fuel within a region were not included.

185 Emissions from electricity generation were derived as:

$$186 \quad CF_{el} = \frac{CC_{fuel}}{eff_{fuel, country}} \cdot f \cdot g$$

187 Where CF_{el} is the carbon footprint from electricity generation [g CO₂/kWh], CC_{fuel} is the car-
188 bon content of a specific fuel [gC/GJ], $eff_{fuel, country}$ is the efficiency of electricity generation

189 from that fuel in that country and f and g are factors to recalculate from GJ to kWh (0.0036)
190 and from gram carbon to gram CO₂ (44/12).

191 The efficiency per fuel per country was derived by dividing the total amount of fuel
192 input to electricity generation in one country in one year (2010) by the electricity output from
193 that fuel in the same country and year over all types of power plants for a specific fuel (both
194 data taken from IEA energy balances 2016). The year 2010 was chosen as reference year in
195 line with the base year for the scenario analysis (see below). For countries where all electric-
196 ity generation from a specific fuel took place in CHP plants only or less than 10,000 TJ were
197 produced, the European average efficiency was applied.

198 *Uncertainties in production emissions*

199 Due to lack of specific data, some parameters were calculated based on studies relating to the
200 United Kingdom or the United States. However, conditions may differ for or between Euro-
201 pean countries. Some extra scenarios have therefore been included to show the effect of these
202 uncertainties on the results. Based on literature (Foster & Perks, 2012; Mackay & Stone,
203 2013; Westaway et al., 2015; Bond et al., 2014) these include:

- 204 • Obligatory green or reduced emissions well completions, where gas is captured, by
205 reducing well completion emission by 90% in our calculations;
- 206 • Electrification, where grid electricity is used instead of diesel for pumping of fracking
207 fluid. To show the largest range in emissions reduction, we assume zero GHG emis-
208 sions from fracking (representing a grid solely based on non-fossil sources).
- 209 • Variation in the number of fracking events (1 or 2);
- 210 • Variation in transport distance for water and additives.

211 Next to the combustion phase, the greenhouse gas emissions of electricity from
212 (shale) gas relative to that of coal also depend on the losses upstream. Sanchez and Mays

213 (2015) and Howarth et al. (2012) summarize several studies that report upstream losses. Val-
214 ues range from 0.42% to 10% for conventional and unconventional natural gas sources. To
215 assess the relation between shale gas and the other fossil sources in a worst case scenario, ad-
216 ditional calculations were performed where losses during production were manually set to 5%
217 and 10% of the production stage output, values at the high end of the percentages given in
218 Table S5. These losses are not allocated to any specific process, but encompass all the
219 sources described above. Likely, higher flowback emissions will contribute substantially to
220 higher production emissions.

221 *Scenario analysis*

222 The effect of changes in the fossil electricity mix, such as the possible future inclusion of
223 shale gas in the electricity generation, was assessed in several scenarios. For each scenario
224 the cumulative carbon footprint was calculated for the EU-28 as a whole and each country
225 separately. The cumulative carbon footprint was defined as the life cycle GHG emissions for
226 total fossil electricity generation summed over the total period in g CO₂-equivalents up to
227 2050. The scenarios were based on the EU Reference Scenario 2016 (EC, 2016). The EU
228 Reference Scenario is based on current legislation and provides estimations of electricity gen-
229 eration per source for every 5 years from 2010 to 2050 and rates of change per decade. From
230 these, the fossil electricity generation per fuel was calculated for each year. The fuel type
231 “solids” was taken to represent coal, with exception of Estonia where it refers to shale oil
232 products. The EU reference scenario also provides an import dependency percentage. These
233 data were applied to derive the following scenarios:

- 234 1. The reference scenario (EC, 2016).

- 235 2. A business as usual scenario, where the contribution of each fuel to the fossil elec-
236 tricity mix was fixed at the 2010 percentage. Total electricity generation from fossil
237 sources developed in the same way as in the reference scenario.
- 238 3. A fuel independence scenario where all imported fossil fuels to Europe are replaced
239 by shale gas from Europe. Hereby it is assumed that the import dependency fraction
240 applies equally to all fuels. For some years/countries, a negative import dependency
241 was estimated in the reference scenario, for these countries no replacements were
242 calculated. In our calculations, all imported fuels were replaced starting from 2020.
243 This replacement would probably take time, but as the rate is unknown, we assume
244 a five year period from 2017-2022, in which we would first overestimate replace-
245 ment rates, compensated by an underestimation in the second half of this period.
- 246 4. Two ‘coal phase out’ scenarios where all coal fired power plants in Europe are
247 closed down before 2030. The cumulative percentage decrease in coal capacity per
248 country was calculated from Rocha et al. (2017). In these scenarios, the capacity
249 was replaced either by shale gas from Europe (scenario 4a) or by conventional gas
250 from current sources (scenario 4b).
- 251 The replacement of other fuels by shale gas is based on these assumptions to pro-
252 vide a transparent indication of emissions effects. It is not based on economical or
253 technical prediction. We realize it is unlikely, that shale gas production in the EU
254 could be introduced at such a fast pace.

255 **Results**

256 *Carbon Footprints from shale gas*

257 The upstream carbon footprints per MJ of shale gas from 9 European basins delivered to four
258 regions in Europe are presented in Figure 2. For every consuming region (North, Central,

259 Southeast and Southwest EU) and shale gas play combination in Figure 2 it is assumed that
260 the shale gas comes uniquely from the one play present in that combination. Total GHG
261 emissions for gas delivered range from 8 to 29 g CO₂-eq/MJ. Contributions of life cycle
262 stages are also shown, illustrating that the largest contribution comes from the production
263 phase of shale gas (6-13 g CO₂-eq/MJ).

264 Carbon footprints for electricity generation from reserve-weighted average shale gas
265 in EU countries is shown in Figure 3. Differences between countries in the same consuming
266 region are entirely related to differences in generation efficiencies. For Europe as a whole, the
267 carbon footprint was 0.45 kg CO₂-eq/kWh.

268 Gas losses during production relative to the production output were between 0.01%-
269 1.8% for conventional gas coming from all countries exporting to Europe and 0.8%-1.3% for
270 shale gas from Europe (SI Table S6).

271 Figure 4 shows changes in carbon footprints for the European average, if a number of
272 alternative scenarios (no fracking energy emissions, reduced emissions completions and vari-
273 ation of number of fracking events) are included. Changes in transport distances lead to mi-
274 nor changes in results that weren't visible in the figure and are therefore not shown. Reducing
275 emissions during well completions had the largest effect on the carbon footprints, in line with
276 earlier results (Bond et al., 2014; Weber & Clavin, 2012).

277 *Scenario analysis*

278 The cumulative carbon footprint for 2020 up to 2050 for each scenario for the EU-total is pre-
279 sented in Figure 5. All scenarios with more gas use (EU independence to a lesser extent, coal
280 phase out and coal phase out with conventional gas to a larger extent) have a lower cumula-
281 tive carbon footprint than the reference and the business as usual scenario. Changes of the
282 fossil fuel carbon footprint over time are shown in Figure 6. It can be seen that in the first

283 years, the business as usual (keeping 2010 values) carbon footprint is actually lower than in
284 the reference scenario and the other scenarios built on the reference scenario, hence also are
285 higher in the first years..

286 To facilitate discussion, Figure 5 also shows the range in cumulated emissions if
287 losses during shale gas production were 5% or even 10% of production output. Losses of 5-
288 10% of overall production are the high-end ranges reported from top-down studies in the US
289 (e.g. Peischl et al., 2015; 2016). Setting production losses to 10% of production stage output
290 increased the European carbon footprint per kWh generated to 0.82 kg CO₂-eq/kWh and for
291 5% to 0.61 kg CO₂-eq/kWh (results not shown). With 10% production losses, the independ-
292 ence scenario would have a higher cumulative carbon footprint than the reference scenario
293 (vertically striped bars in Figure 5). For 5% production losses and the coal phase out scenar-
294 ios, this was not the case (dotted bars in Figure 5) but the differences became fairly small.

295 Results on a country level are shown in Figure S2 in the SI. In general, the country
296 scenario footprints show the same trends as seen for the average EU (Figure 5) but deviations
297 exist (e.g. Belgium and Denmark). Figure 7 shows on a country level the comparison be-
298 tween the reference and the coal phase out scenario in percentage. There are two groups of
299 countries with no change: countries that do not or hardly use any coal for electricity produc-
300 tion (Belgium, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Sweden, Cyprus) or countries where
301 the timing and capacity of the coal phase out coincides with the expected development in the
302 reference scenario (France, Portugal).

303 **Discussion**

304 *Upstream Carbon Footprints*

305 In the literature reported in Table S5 production emissions range between a 1-9 g CO₂-eq/MJ
306 (from below 1% to more than half of the upstream emissions). In a recent LCA for shale gas

307 production in the UK, Tagliaferri et al. (2016) report maximum GHG emissions of 10 g CO₂-
308 eq/MJ, a value only slightly lower than presented in Figure 2. Differences between carbon
309 footprints for play-country combinations arise from differences in production (fugitives and
310 energy use), processing and transport. Due to the large contribution of the production stage to
311 total upstream emissions, differences between production plays are larger than between con-
312 suming regions. As can be seen in Figure 2, differences in carbon footprint of gas between
313 consuming regions are caused by differences in transportation emissions, mainly related to
314 distances but also to losses per unit transport. Processing emissions were relatively high in
315 Germany and were negligible in the Netherlands. This has already been concluded by the
316 COWI report (COWI, 2015): They state that there are no data reported on processing energy
317 use in the Netherlands and that the fugitive emission rate is low. This is in line with the Dutch
318 National Inventory Report to the UNFCCC (Coenen et al., 2017). For Germany, higher pro-
319 cessing emissions are related to the fact that the gas is relatively acidic in Germany and re-
320 quires more processing. For Poland, three basins were included: Lublin, Podlasie and Baltic.
321 Production emissions were higher for the Lublin basin. This is related to the fact that the area
322 covered by the reserve (in m² per m³) is larger for the Lublin basin, requiring more wells and
323 well pads and therefore leading to higher emissions.

324 The bold black line in Figure 2 indicates carbon footprints of conventional gas for the
325 European average around 11 g CO₂-eq/MJ, also in line with earlier studies. For example Faist
326 Emenegger et al. (2007) report a range of 2-26 g CO₂-eq/MJ for Europe and Hauck et al.
327 (2014) report for combined cycle power plants in the US 12 g CO₂-eq/MJ (with a range from
328 9-17 g CO₂-eq/MJ).

329 Sanchez and Mays (2015) and Howarth et al. (2012) summarize several studies that
330 report upstream losses. Values range from 0.42-10% for conventional and unconventional
331 natural gas sources. Le Fevre (2017) reports this range to be between 0 and 1.2%. Our values

332 (0.01%-1.8%, SI Table S6) were more close to Bouman et al. (2015) who cite a lower range
333 of 0.006–2.75% of natural gas production. Schwietzke et al. (2014) in a global modelling
334 study based on atmospheric methane measurements estimates an upper bound for current fu-
335 gitive emission rates of 5% (on average). Losses of around 3% are often cited as a turning
336 point where natural gas might no longer constitute benefits over coal (Heath, et al., 2014b).
337 Recently Alvarez et al. (2018) report an average leakage rate for the US of 2.3%. This value
338 is estimated using ground-based, facility-scale measurements and validated with aircraft ob-
339 servations in areas accounting for ~30% of U.S. gas production. Our loss rates for the Euro-
340 pean domain were below this value.

341 *Electricity generation*

342 Our carbon footprints for electricity from shale gas were within the range reported in litera-
343 ture and summarized in Table S5. Our carbon footprint for electricity from shale gas is
344 slightly lower than the one reported by Stamford & Azapagic (2014). However, their results
345 have been contested by Westaway (2014) mainly due to low expected ultimate recovery as-
346 sumptions (and hence high production emissions per unit produced). Our estimates were in-
347 deed comparable to the lower ranges often reported for the US (Hauck et al., 2014 and refer-
348 ences summarized therein). For other regions, comparable ranges (0.35-0.98 kg CO₂-eq/kWh)
349 are reported (Hayhoe et al., 2002; Faist Emmenegger et al., 2007; Turconi et al., 2013). Fig-
350 ure S1 shows the carbon footprints for electricity from conventional gas (0.35 kg CO₂eq/kWh
351 for the EU) and oil (0.77 kg CO₂eq/kWh for the EU) and coal (1.1 kg CO₂eq/kWh for the
352 EU), confirming that shale gas has a slightly higher carbon footprint than conventional gas
353 and a lower carbon footprint than oil and coal in our calculations. Striking are the high foot-
354 prints from Romania and France, that are caused by the low power plant efficiencies (about

355 30%) as derived from the energy balances. Possible reasons could lie in the specific technolo-
356 gies used in these countries, for instance if gas is mainly used for peak demand (for instance
357 if the baseload is nuclear as in France)and upgrading the small gas-fired powerplants may not
358 be seen as cost-efficient.

359 *Scenario analysis*

360 Low carbon transition according to the EU Roadmap should combine gas with in-
361 creasing contributions of renewable energy and increasing energy efficiency. Renewable
362 fuels and energy efficiencies were explicitly not addressed in this research and no conclu-
363 sions can be drawn on their (relative) contributions. Also note, that the total fossil energy use
364 has been kept unchanged compared to the reference scenario in our analysis. Therefore, ef-
365 fects of earlier or later phase out of fossil fuels are not quantified and cannot be judged based
366 on our analysis. Finally, no assessment has been made of gas use after 2050. For instance,
367 McGlade et al. (2014) point out that gas could be a climate beneficial bridge fuel only if it's
368 timely phased out after a transition period is guaranteed.

369 Figure 5 shows a reduction in the cumulated carbon footprint from fossil energy of
370 about 9000 Mt CO₂-eq. in 2050 between the reference and the coal phase out scenario. Rocha
371 et al. (2017) estimate the total cumulative CO₂ emissions from coal electricity with current
372 plants in 2050 to be about 12145 Mt, indicating that a large part of these emissions would in-
373 deed be mitigated by the phase out scenario using gas.

374 The country analysis (Figure S2), shows that the reduction potentials depend on the
375 reference scenario development. For some countries, for instance Denmark, Lithuania and the
376 UK, the difference between BAU and other scenarios is more prominent than on the EU level
377 (and the difference between the reference scenario and the other scenarios is smaller). The
378 main reason is that these countries already have a reduction of carbon intensive energy gener-
379 ation (i.e. a decreasing fossil source) in the reference scenario early after 2010.

380 Several aspects could influence the relation between scenarios in the future. Reserve
381 availability could also affect shale gas potential. In our analysis for the whole EU, 66% and
382 45% of the total shale gas reserves (as defined in this research) would be used by 2050 in the
383 independence scenario and in the coal phase out scenario, respectively. However, our esti-
384 mated reserves are technically recoverable reserves. These reserves might not be (fully) eco-
385 nomically recoverable in the future. Lower production would lead to higher upstream emis-
386 sions per unit of gas produced and less benefits for scenarios using shale gas. On the other
387 hand, current estimates might not represent future practices. For instance, MacKay and Stone
388 (2013) state that flowback fugitives might be completely captured in the future, increasing fu-
389 ture benefits of using (shale) gas by reducing CH₄ losses.

390 Note that only uncertainties in the carbon footprint of shale gas were taken into ac-
391 count in our scenarios. Uncertainties in the upstream emissions of other fuels could also in-
392 fluence the comparison of our results. For instance, for CH₄ losses during coal mining the
393 country-level IPCC reported factors were used for coal carbon footprints. Recently, Zhu et al.
394 (2017) showed that, for China these factors might overestimate actual emissions and ignore
395 variations between mines in the same country. This illustrates that, like the US studies for
396 shale gas, more top-down studies are needed for coal production regions as well. Lower up-
397 stream emissions for coal would slightly reduce the benefits of the coal phase out scenarios.
398 Likewise, sources of conventional gas and oil are kept constant in our analysis. Reserve avail-
399 ability as well as political and economic changes might lead to a shift in these sources,
400 thereby changing also the carbon footprint of the European gas mix. Several authors (Stam-
401 ford & Azapagic, 2014; Faist-Emenegger et al., 2007; Russ, 2017) concluded that gas im-
402 ported as LNG has a higher carbon footprint than gas transported by pipeline due to energy
403 use for liquefaction and losses at the LNG terminal. Therefore, depending on this shift in mix,
404 benefits of using more conventional gas could actually increase or decrease.

405 *Conclusions*

406 To estimate the carbon footprint of shale gas produced in Europe for consumption within Eu-
407 rope we modified and expanded an existing GHG emission estimation model. We used 9 Eu-
408 ropean shale gas plays as potential production regions. Moreover, extra (compared to conven-
409 tional gas) GHG emission sources during shale gas production, such as fugitives from hy-
410 draulic fracturing or combustion emissions from horizontal drilling were added to conven-
411 tional gas emissions. Results are expressed as g CO₂-equivalents per MJ delivered, and calcu-
412 lated for a kWh of electricity generated. Total GHG emissions from the use of European
413 shale gas for electricity production range from 0.42 to 0.78 kg CO₂-eq/kWh when the com-
414 bustion phase emissions are included. This is in the range reported in literature.

415 Our results indicate an advantage of gas over other fossil sources in a wide range of
416 scenarios. Comparison to non-fossil sources, however, was outside the scope of this study.
417 Additionally, the fossil energy use was kept in line with the EU reference scenario for all sce-
418 narios over our scenarios. Conclusions are relevant for the period up to 2050 and not beyond.
419 Several lessons can be learned from our calculations:

- 420 • Lower carbon footprints of (shale) gas over coal for electricity generation were con-
421 firmed. This was also true when considering EU wide scenarios, as mostly when
- 422 • gas was used instead of other fossil fuels, the scenarios had lower cumulative foot-
423 prints.
- 424 • These are only reversed with very high (10%) upstream losses for shale gas for our
425 independence scenario. From this, we conclude that with the current knowledge there
426 is still a substantial climate benefit to replace coal with (shale) gas even in the EU ref-
427 erence scenario.

- 428
- We highlight, however, that for the carbon footprints of electricity generation the efficiencies in the power plants are most important, which is clearly seen for two countries with low-efficiency gas fired powerplants still in place . Likewise, reliable estimations of footprints depend on the quality of underlying statistics.
- 429
- 430
- 431
- Assessing timelines as done in our research gives additional insights compared to assessment on a side-year, because emissions during the transition path are also taken into account.
- 432
- 433
- 434
- Several policy recommendations can be deduced from our analysis: Considering the relevance of the combustion phase, high efficiency power plants should be preferred in any case and scenario. To reduce the carbon footprint of shale gas, reducing well completions emissions (green or reduced emissions completions) are most relevant.
- 435
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439

440 **Declaration of interest statement.** We declare no financial interest or benefit that has arisen from
441 the direct applications of our research.
442

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618 10.1021/acs.est.7b01857
619

620 **Tables and Figures**

621 Table 1. Recoverable reserves and surface areas for shale gas plays in Europe (Visschedijk et
622 al, 2018).

Country	Play	Reserve (m ³)	Surface (km ²)
UK	Bowland Basin	7.1E+11	2.5E+04
Poland	Lublin Basin	2.6E+11	2.9E+04
Poland	Podlasie Basin	2.7E+11	9.4E+03
Poland	Baltic Basin	2.9E+12	4.8E+04
Netherlands ^{a)}	Geverik Member (Epen Formation)	9.3E+10	1.0E+04
Denmark	Alum Shale	2.6E+11	1.6E+04
Sweden	Alum Shale	9.0E+11	7.0E+03
Germany	Posidonia Shale	2.8E+11	2.4E+04
France	Paris Basin	4.8E+11	2.6E+04

623 a) For the Netherlands, including the Dutch continental shelf, the estimated risk recovera-
624 ble reserve and SG play's contours according to EIA have been replaced by other more recent
625 and accurate data provided by petroleum geologists from TNO. Based on ongoing research at
626 TNO (e.g. Zijp et al., 2015) the SG data for the Netherlands is continuously updated and form
627 the basis on which TNO annually reports on the Dutch energy reserves to the Ministry.

628


629 Table 2. Values and sources used for the calculation of extra shale specific emissions during
 630 gas production.

Value	Source
Fuel use for horizontal drilling	
837760 kJ diesel per meter drilled	Broderick et al., 2011
2000 m horizontal drilling length per well	Costa et al., 2016; Cremonese, 2016
Hydraulic fracturing and flowback	
<i>Fuel use for pumping</i>	
110,000 l diesel/event	Broderick et al. (2011) based on wells in the Marcellus shale reported by New York state
Number of hydraulic fracturing events: 1.5 (50% of the wells re-fracture once)	Broderick et al. (2011), with a range from 1 to 2
<i>Fuel use for transport</i>	
Volume transported per fracturing event: 20,000 m ³	Assumption based on range in Broderick et al. (2011); with a range from 9,000-29,000m ³
Transport distance: 60km	Broderick et al. (2011)
0.001 kJ diesel per tkm transported	Ecoinvent lifecycle inventory database (Spielmann et al., 2007; Wernet et al., 2016)
<i>Fugitive emissions</i>	

0.77% ^a of production volume	References in Broderick et al. (2011), giving a range of 0.6%-3.2%
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
631 a) Due to interdependence of emissions and production volumes, this value is highly uncer-
632 tain.

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
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635 Figure 1




636

637 Figure 2



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
639 Figure 3



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
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Figure 4




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643 Figure 5



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645 Figure 6



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647 Figure 7

648 **Figure captions**

649 Figure 1. Flow of the carbon footprint calculations and system boundaries for upstream foot-
650 prints, electricity generation and scenario comparison

651 Figure 2. Carbon Footprints [$\text{gCO}_2\text{-eq./MJ}$ delivered] from shale gas produced in European
652 plays (horizontal countries on x-axis), delivered to four European regions (vertical regions on
653 x-axis). Contribution of life cycle stages is also shown (blue with dots: production, red filled:
654 processing, green striped: transmission). Horizontal black line indicates conventional gas de-
655 livered to the consumption-weighted average of all European regions. Poland 1: Lublin Ba-
656 sin; Poland 2: Podlasie Basin; Poland 3: Baltic Basin.

657 Figure 3. Carbon footprints for electricity generation from shale gas in European countries
658 including the combustion phase [$\text{kg CO}_2\text{eq/kWh}$].

659

660 Figure 4. Comparison of carbon footprints in original calculations ('default') and in addi-
661 tional scenarios: electric fracking ('no fracking energy emissions'); reduced emissions com-
662 plements ('REC'); change in number of fracking events (1 ('frac 1') or 2 ('frac 2')); panel a)
663 for gas production; panel b) for electricity generation for the European average.

664 Figure 5. Cumulative carbon footprints CF up to 2050 for the reference, business as usual
665 (BAU), independence and two coal phase out scenarios (CG: conventional gas; SG: shale
666 gas).

667 Figure 6. Development of carbon footprints of fossil electricity generation [$\text{kg CO}_2\text{eq/kWh}$]
668 for the EU-28 in five scenarios (BAU: business as usual; CG: conventional gas; SG: shale
669 gas).

670 Figure 7. Comparison of the coal phase out scenario to the reference scenario for EU coun-
671 tries.

672