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European innovation policy: new rationales and challenges

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TITLE

European innovation policy: new rationales and challenges

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Abstract:

In Europe there is clear interest on the instrumental role of innovation to face the grand challenges and the subsequent effects on economic performance. There are several forces of historical relevance that contribute to this interest. First, the world faces significant number of long term challenges (e.g., climate change, population ageing, pollution, water and critical raw materials scarcities, to mention some). Second, international competition moved to a multi-polar era where the rules of the competitive game are reset. Policies and symmetries that regulate international competitiveness are rapidly changing. Third, often emerging economies master the know-how not only for cost but also innovation driven competition in traditional and high-tech sectors. Fourth, in advanced economies governments can no longer rely on the electorate's confidence and the legitimacy of policy agendas to ensure societal welfare, employment and boosting demand and growth in the context of national austerity plans, currently the norm in Europe after the 2008 financial meltdown. Europe has partially banked on innovation as a saviour for its competitiveness but global innovation dynamics are a riddle with a number of internal contradictions and emergent properties not easy to tackle. This paper presents elements indicating that European policy is reorienting under the logic of grand challenges and systems integration to participate in a new global restructuring, logic that is likely to realign production and innovation networks under a new rationale and political discourse.

JEL codes: O31, O32, N7, Q48

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43 **1. Introduction**

44 Can European innovation and industrial policy keep up with global innovation and production
45 dynamics? Europe is committed to maintain its welfare model in the long run but challenging this
46 commitment are two important developments. The first concerns the building of Europe itself
47 and its internal contractions that are continually evolving and limiting its capacity to swiftly act
48 globally with a single voice (see Simms, 2014; Lehdorff, 2012; Van Meddelaar, 2013). The
49 second regards significant shifts in the international competitive landscape where Europe
50 appears to be losing ground in traditional and advanced technology markets (see Tate *et al.*,
51 2014; and Kinkel, 2014). The focus of this paper concerns the second development. This paper
52 argues that despite its internal contractions Europe is striving in the co-creation of a new global
53 market structure. The latter according to new and ambitious vision reflected in several policy
54 documents aiming to create new global value networks and provide new rationales for
55 globalization (see, European Commission, 2012; van de Velde *et al.*, 2013). It will be shown in this
56 paper that weak signals indicate at the aggregated level that Europe is underway in the
57 preparation of the terrain to remain a relevant global actor on innovation and production
58 networks - with or without full concerted action of its member states.

59

60 The vision consists of creating the conditions for a grand structural transformation, mediated by
61 new knowledge and innovation. Where such transformation is aiming not only to fulfil the goals
62 of the European 2020 Strategy (a smart, sustainable and inclusive Europe)¹ but also contributing
63 to tackle the grand challenges (by providing new approaches and technical solutions embedded
64 in new technological applications, products, services, standards, regulations and institutions). In
65 this new strategy global innovation networks are to be an important factor that serve as leverage
66 for global restructuring. The new global innovation networks to a large extent and from 2020
67 onwards are likely to be organised around contributing to the solution of the grand human
68 challenges underpinned by logic of systems integration, whereby several key trends justify such
69 new rationale.

70

71 The paper aims to provide some of the elements that justify the appropriateness of a new
72 approach and rationale for global innovation networks and their competitive environment as
73 well as bring to the forefront a number of issues for policy intervention. The paper is organised in
74 an inductive fashion progressing from the presentation of how the international competitive
75 context has evolved from export oriented to innovation driven to likely derive in the next decade
76 in a challenge and demand driven paradigm, where intrinsic human and natural issues are used

¹ European Commission (2010, 2014)

77 as leverages to generate institutions that legitimise the creation of new markets. Section two
78 describes synthetically the evolution of the international competitive context. Section three
79 defines what is known as the grand challenges and outlines their relevance for future global
80 competitiveness. Section four presents what could be an evolving model that could serve as
81 blueprint for other grand challenges underpinning future markets and new geopolitical
82 asymmetries but also great opportunities for global innovation networks to underpin new
83 international collaboration models. Section five looks into some actions in Europe and the
84 platform provided by the 2020 Strategy and one of its strongest arms, the Horizon 2020 Research
85 and Innovation Program. The last section offers some reflections and discusses challenges for the
86 operation of global innovation networks themselves under a new rationale and some policy
87 implications.

88

89 **2. Evolution of the international competitive context**

90 The evolution of the international competitive context from mid last century to date could be
91 described along three stages that overlap for some years until a dominant paradigm emerges and
92 remain stable for about two decades. The first stage was characterised by a strong focus on the
93 creation of national competences in R&D and industrial organisation oriented to the substitution
94 of imports focusing on national demand up to the late seventies. The organisation of production
95 was done in vertical and horizontal fashion following Fordist and Taylorist approaches (Piore and
96 Sabel, 1984). Strong labour unionisation and regulatory frameworks favouring national industry
97 towards substitution of imports existed (Boyer and Saillard, 2002). Large investments in R&D
98 activity had often national mission characteristics. Innovation activity and management occurred
99 primarily within the confines of vertical integration.

100

101 *Second stage of evolution*

102

103 A second stage that opens a great restructuration of industrial organisation characterised by an
104 export oriented model. The first experiments of off-shoring manufacturing and the creation of
105 export platforms date back to the mid-sixties (Hong-Kong and Mexico). This stage is known and
106 characterised by the international outsourcing and globalisation of production. Such model was
107 enabled by the advent of the flexibilisation of technologies (multipurpose), labour (lower
108 unionisation) and capital (deregulation of capital flows across countries). The competitiveness of
109 firms and of regions to attract foreign investment in the form of production facilities was
110 condition for the following relative factors compared to conditions faced by competing firms or
111 offered by other potential host regions: cost of labour; availability of educated and skilled
112 labour; labour unionization; availability and cost of critical raw materials (e.g., energy, water,

113 minerals, etc.); fiscal regime (tax exemptions); available infrastructures (roads, ports, railways,
114 etc.); regulatory regime stringency (labour, health, safety and environment); easiness to open
115 and close businesses; social and government stability (see Bernard *et al.*, 2006; Faust, *et al.*,
116 2004; Pennings and Sleuwagen, 2000; Boyer and Saillard, 2002; Koido, 2000; Driscoll and
117 Berhman, 1984).

118

119 This period up to the turn of the century created a new international competitive environment
120 where firms enjoying the best conditions listed above were likely to have better performance. In
121 mid to high technology sectors (electronics, automotive, aviation, pharma, etc.) R&D and
122 innovation started to play a more important role in defining global competitiveness and the
123 internationalisation of R&D became more common and widespread. As the off-shoring model
124 became more common and was mastered by many thus eroding the competitive edge of the
125 firms operating in such a model.

126

127 *Third stage of evolution*

128

129 The entry to the third stage of evolution of the competitive context at the turn of the century is
130 characterised by such erosion on profits margins and this demanded changes in the firms'
131 competitive strategy in a globalised organisation of production landscape. Labour cost was a key
132 factor in the second stage but in the third stage become less relevant given the effects of factors
133 like relative increases and levelling over time of wages of competing hosting regions, productivity
134 increases in off-shoring countries firms are now facing new changes but also to new major
135 concerns regarding the efficiency of off-shoring operations. Such issues include quality of
136 intermediate components and final products, lead time for delivery (trans-ocean shipping from
137 Asia to the U.S. for example takes at least two weeks), higher complexity of global operations,
138 greater environmental and regulatory awareness in host countries, endogenous demand and
139 social stability in host country, etc. (Kinkel, 2014, *Dachs et al.*, 2014). The factors that provided
140 competitive edge in the second stage of evolution became a necessary but not sufficient
141 condition for good firm performance.

142

143 Global innovation networks appear when firms off-shore aspects of the production, application
144 and exploitation of knowledge including for example: software development, engineering,
145 product design, research and development (Lewin and Peeters, 2006). Thus, higher importance
146 is given to R&D and innovation, specially global innovation networks are recognised to be vital in
147 the long run as this provide access to critical new knowledge from the best available global
148 sources (Ernst, 2006). Firms seek to acquire knowledge expensive to develop in-house using

149 specialized suppliers, to complement their capacity for product development and capital
150 requirements (Lewin, A.Y. & Couto, 2007). A strong interdependence exists between GIN and
151 Global Production Networks when the aim of off-shoring innovation activities is gaining access to
152 local foreign markets. It is well known that major European brands have located R&D and
153 innovation facilities in China to gain access to highly qualified researches but also to adapt
154 products and services to the local market (Tate *et al.*, 2014, Kinkel, 2014). At the same time the
155 R&D and innovation local capacity in host regions questions the current governance innovation
156 models. The issue of re-shoring is currently prominent as firms must decide to gauge risk on
157 intellectual property management when outsourcing entire manufacturing systems with their
158 latest technology to host far away countries (Tate *et al.*, 2014).

159

160 This stage is also characterised by the advent of new strong competitors innovation based
161 (China, Korea, Singapore, Japan, Taiwan, etc.) that maintain high rates of R&D investments and
162 patenting. In this stage key issues for firms and countries industrial policy are the upgrade on
163 global value chains, the creation of brands and control of OEMs (Ems and Low, 2013). Two
164 important characteristics in this third stage concern the nature of R&D and innovation activities
165 in themselves that are also evolving. The R&D capability that in previous stages was privilege of
166 large and vertical integrated companies is currently more fragmented and frequently outsourced
167 and off-shored in a way that R&D capability might have the characteristics of a commodity.
168 Furthermore, often the benefits of large R&D investment are gained downstream in the value
169 chain, thus R&D having a characteristic of a risky commodity to produce. These concerns about
170 R&D activity are now accompanied by innovation cycles that are evermore shorter and often
171 occurring in open innovation networks or common platforms sharing standards.

172

173 *Inevitable emergence of a fourth stage*

174

175 At first sight the fact that Europe by itself accounts for about 30% of the total world share in key
176 science and technology indicators that are critical for innovation provides an reasonable
177 competitive margin in world innovation affairs² (European Commission 2014). This is questioned
178 by the implicit dynamics of learning and knowledge accumulation by all the actors in the global
179 market place. It is clear that as the different competitive stages evolve in time different players
180 learn the rules of the game and accumulate knowledge and skills until a significant number of
181 players level the competition field. Although all the elements, operational and contextual, that
182 affected competitive performance remain relevant now it seems clear that innovation became a

² These indicators include: Science and technology graduates, Number of researchers (FTE), gross domestic expenditure on R&D, high impact publications and patent applications.

183 must to gain competitive edge in current markets but also to create new ones and this requires
184 orchestration skills that to some extent have been already learned by many global players. As in
185 previous stages all the players learned the tricks and there is a likely progressive race to the
186 bottom where R&D&I become short lived commodities and price competition rules. If the model
187 prevalent in stage three is due to suffer erosion like previous competitive models leading to
188 decreasing returns to R&D and innovation investments for those engaged in those activities the
189 question here arises: What is the next and future long term strategy?

190

191 There seems to be a new rationale with several key components that might define the next
192 competitive context whereby international collaboration might play a major role. Future
193 competitiveness is no longer defined as the struggle to remain competitive in current markets,
194 but primarily as the creation of new markets, underpinned by change and innovation (Montalvo
195 *et al.*, 2011). The question here is how to create and legitimise these new, hopefully global
196 markets? How is the new mode of production and innovation to be driven? Some of the new
197 elements seem to be related to the digitation and manufacturing process enabled by new
198 technologies in robotics, 3D printing, and automation networks connected to the internet (the
199 internet of things - IoT). In some instances this emerging paradigm is known as industry 4.0
200 (German version) or Smart Industry (Dutch version).

201

202 In summary, new ICTs and manufacturing technologies enabling the reorganisation of two core
203 aspects of industrial organisation. First, the remote monitoring and control of key aspects of
204 manufacturing activities (materials, inventories and flows, quality monitoring and maintenance
205 of machinery). Second, the digitation and creation of design platforms for customer intimacy
206 directly linked to the production of goods and services now promises the conduction of relative
207 low cost beyond modular to individualized design and production leading to full individualised
208 mass customisation. More recently enabling customer driven experiments of small production
209 series where the aim is to produce of a kind product with apparent little effort. Design,
210 production and delivery systems are fast moving towards fulfilling the wishes of the individual
211 customer with greater intimacy. New digitation technologies enables that the wishes of a single
212 customer organise a unique and entire value chain and production network (see Dietel, 2013;
213 EFFRA 2013; Sauer, 2013).

214

215 **3. The grand human challenges**

216 During the last 8 years there has been an upsurge of interest on instrumental role of innovation
217 to face the grand challenges and the subsequent effects on economic performance (Montalvo *et*
218 *al.*, 2006; Aghion *et al.*, 2009; EC, 2010; Montalvo *et al.*, 2011). According to the Joint Institute for

219 Innovation Policy the grand challenges political discourse have been important for innovation,
220 growth and facing social and environmental problems (Leijten *et al*, 2012). Addressing the grand
221 human challenges will require several decades as these tend to be highly complex problems,
222 requiring the participation and cooperation of multiple agencies and stakeholders within and
223 across nations, characterized as long term problems requiring long term investments. European
224 policy agenda has selected a number of great challenges that were considered critical for the
225 wellbeing of European citizen.

226

227 *Health* – including diseases of the young and elderly; neurodegenerative, musculoskeletal and
228 chronic diseases; millennium development goals; ageing and well-being; personalized medicine;

229 *Food* – including bio-economy; forestry; and marine and maritime research;

230 *Energy* – including a new focus on gas; energy security; smart grids; energy storage; back-up and
231 balancing technologies; carbon capture and utilization;

232 *Transport* – including mobility and logistics;

233 *Climate* – including water management; biodiversity; raw material; eco-innovation;

234 *Societies* – including demography; social sciences humanities; innovation; and cultural heritage
235 and European identity;

236 *Security* – fighting crime; illegal trafficking and terrorism; protection of critical infrastructures;
237 border management; resilience to crisis and disaster; privacy on the Internet; an EU external
238 security policy; conflict prevention and peace building.

239

240 All the above challenges often have relevance from local to global scale thus requiring broad
241 policy actions due to their unparalleled scale. In the policy discourse, there is consensus that
242 finding solutions to these challenges require doing things and business differently and that, to a
243 large extent, the preferred mechanisms are the generation and usage of new knowledge and
244 innovation (e.g., European Commission, 2009; European Commission, 2010; OECD, 2011;
245 European Commission 2012). This implies the need to orient innovation systems and research
246 infrastructures towards the grand challenges (Cagnin *et al.*, 2012). In the case of grand
247 challenges the notion of innovation in particular is connected to new business models often
248 positioned to bring win-win situations (Porter and Kramer, 2011). Consequently, interest in the
249 provision of solutions to the grand challenges is rapidly increasing. This is in part consequence of
250 the number of issues being so large and pervasive across the world that the idea of transforming
251 challenges into business opportunities and new markets has sparked fundamental interest in the
252 business community. Such interest couples in the policy realm the need for a new global
253 rationale to boost employment and growth with the requirement demanded by the sustainability

254 agenda, i.e., to reinvent a significant proportion of our technological stock supporting the current
255 production and consumption portfolios.

256

257 Policies, regulations and investments to face the challenges mentioned above require be
258 designed, enacted and implemented through actions under the rationale of systems of systems
259 and global systems integration (or coordination). The need for such approach arises from the fact
260 that although the effects of the grand challenges are felt at the local and regional level, many of
261 these challenges are moderated by globalisation and cut across several economic sectors and
262 national boundaries by mere definition. Changes in rationales beyond mere employment and
263 growth generation, issues to tackle, and priorities to implement, will lead to changes in actors
264 with influence and leverage in different nodes of the global value networks. What is clearly
265 required is a massive impulse on behavioural change and innovation at different levels. Such
266 impulse will need not only push for innovation concerning the way production and consumption
267 styles are organized but also institutional innovation that enable changes in rules and regulations
268 concerning designs, services, production processes and industrial relations. As leading and
269 emerging economies are aiming to complement competitive strategies driven by cost
270 optimisation with R&D and innovation driven by demand, there will be the need to bring forward
271 new policy concepts that incorporate global value chains, IPR governance, financial flows and
272 regulation, maintenance of R&D infrastructures at home, optimisation of value chain integration,
273 etc. Global innovation networks present reinforcing characteristics that create synergies
274 increasing importance. In particular the Grand Challenges require international collaboration to
275 find and implement not only inter-firm and cross-sector actions and solutions but also
276 coordinated actions across national borders. In that sense global innovation networks are likely
277 to support not only the access to the markets but also to diffuse new regulations, standards and
278 practices that support innovation and change enabling such solutions.

279

280 **4. Grand challenge model setting the path**

281 Where to look for a model to follow? Recent history provide us a model to analyse the likely
282 pattern of development of a particular grand challenge and the relation with innovation
283 networks and global production: The issue of climate change in relation to energy. In general we
284 can describe in an stylized form how an structuration process develops from the identification
285 and legitimization of a grand challenge to the creation and expansion of a new market mediated
286 by technical change and innovation. The following sequence of events is not necessarily linear
287 and there are some recursive loops, the structuration process would include (for examples of
288 such structuration process see Kern *et al.*, 2014; Giddens, 2009): definition of the grand
289 challenge (the issue); development and accumulation of a critical mass across different type of


290 actors that recognize the issue as important and willing to generate visions and contribute to the
291 solution; appearance of lobbying groups (pro and against) and increased public debate;
292 emergence of institutions advocating, hosting and proposing approaches to address the issue;
293 technical and managerial approaches are developed to address the issue; adoption of the issue in
294 the policy agenda by government and multilateral organizations; investments flows to develop
295 and test solutions while patenting and IPRs are settled; early adoption sprout niche markets
296 supported by policy instruments (e.g., taxes and subsidies), investments for production up-
297 scaling often takes following sectoral policy and regulation and wider diffusion takes place;
298 regulation and standards start to consolidate markets; mass markets growth, competition and
299 distribution of production location become issues for industrial policy.

300

301 Climate change and innovation could be well one of the first visible and working models of grand
302 challenges and innovation striving to restructure global production and consumption in energy
303 markets. Some of the elements and events of such model for the case of climate change and
304 energy agendas are outlined below. Figures 1, 2 and 3 encapsulate and present a summary of the
305 process outlined above in few indicators. Figure 1 shows the number of publications on climate
306 change and Figure 2 depicts the parallel development of technical solutions as well as the period
307 in which institutions advocating for the taking of actions to wrestle the sources and potential
308 effects of climate change were created. In a large number of publications most of the attention
309 so far has been given to energy sources and usage but also linking to other sectors as diverse as
310 transport, lighting, construction, cement, agriculture, etc.

311

312 **Figure 1. Number of publications on the topic of climate change**



313

314 Based on Stanhill (2001), Google Scholar (“Climate change” keyword in title hits in February 2014)

315


316 In Figure 1 it can be noticed the confluence of two important developments. A very rapid
317 increase in the number of publications and the building of consensus that climate change exists
318 and the main cause was the combination of number of gases in the atmosphere, specially CO₂.
319 Since 1977 the number of published papers doubles every 11 years, the trend continues to date
320 (Stanhill 2001) confirmed by recent searchers in Google Scholar. Matching a logarithmic increase
321 over a decade of three orders of magnitude in the number of publications in 1988, the United
322 Nations Inter-governmental Panel in Climate Change was created. The creation of such
323 institution required massive debate in multilateral organisations.

324

325 Transiting the road to the first agreement on limiting global emissions took about nine years and
326 in 1997 the first agreement on the Kyoto Protocol was undersigned by some nations. The
327 signature of the protocol and later the targets negotiations legitimated at a global scale the need
328 for actions to mitigate the potential effects of climate change. Although a significant debate
329 continued on the effects of climate change, technology solutions development reflected in
330 patenting activity across key players in renewable energy technology increased significantly after
331 the agreements of the Kyoto targets to limit CO₂ present in the atmosphere. Figure two shows
332 the evolution of patenting activity between 1979-2003 and the period of the two major events
333 creating new institutions in charge of promoting an agenda that would have massive global
334 impact in the enactment of national policies supporting the development and diffusion of
335 alternative sources of energy.

336

337 **Figure 2 Patenting activity and climate change debate evolution**



338


339 Based on Johnstone (2010)

340

341 Although there are still sceptics concerning the climate change projections (Whitmarsh, 2011;
342 Poortinga *et al.*, 2011) the need for action to reduce CO₂ emissions has entered in the discourse
343 and policy agendas and thus gained legitimacy the “urgent” need for action.³ Similarly markets
344 have reacted to the challenge and economic opportunities this brings for global business. With a
345 time lag of just a few years following the increase of patenting rate shown in Figure 2, the level of
346 reported investment in the production and installation of renewable energy technologies has
347 also significantly increased during the last decade across the key global players in the renewable
348 energy technology markets. Figure 3 below shows sharp increases in the levels of investment in
349 renewable energy technologies from 24.8 billion in 2004 to 148.5 billion in 2012. Major country
350 investors are Europe, China and the U.S.

351

352 **Figure 3 Global investment trends all renewables (US\$ Bn)**



353

354 Based on (McCrone 2014)

355

356 The interest is becoming clear from the large increase of capital flowing into energy related
357 innovations. For example, Ethical Markets Media reported already in 2011 a \$2.4 trillion
358 cumulative worldwide investment in eco-innovation during the period 2007-2011, while the
359 expected cumulative investment by the year 2020 was estimated at \$10 trillion (Montalvo *et al.*,
360 2011). Coincidentally, innovations contributing to face the grand challenges (e.g., in energy,
361 mobility, water, etc.) are creating new global markets, allowing smart specialization of some
362 regions and giving governments politically more comfortable long-term horizons for policy
363 action.

364

³ See for example the cases of the United Kingdom and The Netherlands concerning stark changes in the policy discourse and the instruments used to promote changes in the energy system between 2000 and 2011, demonstrating a paradigm shift in policy approaches to promote innovation in energy technologies (see Kern, 2011, and Kern *et al.*, 2014).

365 Climate change as a grand challenge is one of a kind that presents truly global natural
366 connectivity beyond the control or intervention of humans with strong local and regional
367 implications. Other challenges like water, energy, security , immigration, have also global
368 connotations but regional agendas tend to dominate. Here the value of global innovation
369 networks is that with the of science and technology serve as an arena that can help to mediate
370 potential conflict. The strong and long standing collaborative dynamics of global innovation
371 networks specially in the area of R&D might have some lessons to offer to other areas of policy
372 and reduce conflict.

373

374 **5. Europe towards 2020 and beyond**

375 After a decade of increasing productivity accompanied with decreasing employment rates,
376 sluggish demand and economic growth Europe is in the mid of the implementation of a transition
377 stage. The transition period might range from the end of the strategic period guided by the
378 Lisbon Strategy in 2010 to the end of the Europe 2020 Strategy. The Lisbon Strategy had several
379 flagship targets (notably growth, employment, productivity, innovation and research, education
380 and training and social and environmental policies) that were not met during its implementation
381 period. For this failure to meet the targets the European Commission was strongly criticized
382 (European Parliament, 2011). The mid-review and end of the Lisbon strategy period demanded a
383 different rationale with a more ambitious and inclusive strategy that would allow pursuing
384 previous targets but also allowing a different emphasis. Such new emphasis would provide some
385 political slack and higher legitimacy for new policies. Exploratory and evaluation studies on the
386 rationale of the grand human challenges for innovation policy making date back to 2006 (e.g.,
387 Montalvo *et al.* 2006, Leijten *et al.*, 2012; McGrath *et al.*, 2014). After 2010 with the advent of the
388 new European 2020 strategy the notion that Europe should focus its efforts to tackle the grand
389 human challenges became mainstream in policy documents (Cagni *et al.*, 2012). What is new in
390 the approach taken in Europe is the commitment (or need) to create a shared vision or goals
391 aiming to guide a broad international community as a mean to bring Europe to the front of R&D
392 and innovation (Leijten *et al.*, 2012). Giving the nature of the Grand Challenges this would
393 require the consolidation of political legitimacy of such rationale, new technological and
394 innovation options, new standards and regulations.

395

396 European policy is reorienting, this in itself can make a difference in creating the framework
397 conditions for such new rationale to prosper and diffuse across and the single market. The period
398 2010-2020 can be considered a transitional phase where the foundations for the period 2020-
399 2050 are to be settle. Such foundations are to face the grand human challenges and the new
400 global geopolitical competitive landscape. As described above in the new landscape rules of the

401 game for industrial competitiveness are not favourable for many of traditional and middle
402 technological sophistication sectors. Emerging economies are advancing not only in knowledge
403 infrastructures, patenting and the organization of production and exploitation of new
404 knowledge. Such new competitive landscape requires a significant restructuration of the global
405 patterns of production and exploitation of knowledge. The notion of the grand human challenges
406 offers the opportunity to articulate such new structure. Innovation is to play an important role in
407 such process as a mean for restructuration and legitimation of new global markets under strong
408 interdependence dynamics.

409

410 The transition starts with the implementation of Horizon 2020 up to 2020. The greatest portion
411 of the budget Research and Innovation framework program *Horizon 2020*, almost 40%, i.e., 31
412 billion Euro, is dedicated to explore and create approaches and technologies to tackling the so-
413 called 'Grand Challenges' (Judkiewicz, 2014) . From a political economy perspective the 2020
414 European Strategy underpinned by the notion of the grand challenges aims to: 1) Develop and
415 mature new competences, skills and technologies according to the definition of specific
416 challenges contributing to the solution of a grand challenge; 2) Setting up new institutions,
417 standards and regulations supporting European industrial and markets leadership, and 3) Create
418 global consensus and shared visions that underpin the creation of new markets. Point one of
419 such agenda and vision is reflected across the many research and innovation programs that
420 conform Horizon 2020. For example programs like Factories of the future, Future and emerging
421 technologies, Leadership in enabling and industrial technologies. Such programs are oriented to
422 tackle the grand challenges, underpin international global networks and to set the grounds for
423 global industrial leadership.

424

425 **6. Discussion**

426 From the presented above and what is gathered from the literature and policy documents, there
427 is clear interest on the instrumental role of innovation and in particular global innovation
428 networks to face the grand challenges and the subsequent effects on economic performance. As
429 described above, there are several forces of historical relevance that contribute to this interest.
430 First, the world is facing a significant number of long term challenges including climate change,
431 population ageing, desertification, water scarcity, pollution, and critical raw materials scarcities.
432 Second, the international economic context has moved to a new, multi-polar era in which the
433 rules of the competitive game are being reset. The policies that have traditionally ruled
434 international competitiveness are rapidly changing. Leading economies and newcomers into
435 global markets (e.g. Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, etc.) have
436 mastered not only the know-how for cost driven competition (Contractor *et al.*, 2010) but they

437 have also become innovative in traditional and in selected high-tech sectors (Montobbio *et al.*,
438 2010). Firms and regions seek to differentiate themselves to become leaders in international
439 trade via innovation and smart specialization (Foray, 2009). Third, in several advanced
440 economies, governments can no longer rely on the electorate's confidence and legitimacy in
441 policy agendas to ensure the societal welfare, employment and boosting demand and growth in
442 the context of national austerity plans are currently the norm in Europe after the 2008 financial
443 meltdown.

444

445 Europe has banked on innovation as a saviour for its competitiveness⁴ but as seen above global
446 innovation dynamics are a riddle with a number of internal contradiction not easy to tackle. The
447 implementation of a shared vision to solve the grand challenges require the capacity to create
448 convergence and the capacity to interoperate with multiple actors, thinking and acting at the
449 local and global levels where needed. This would require to operate under the logic of systems of
450 systems towards systems integration (or coordination) that is often at odds with decentralised
451 decision making and management akin to sectoral approaches (the mere definition of the
452 challenges based on sector definitions). The later requires addressing the potential for better
453 coordinated EU industrial policy. An overarching EU industrial policy that boasts an international
454 smart, sustainable and inclusive specialization is more likely to be feasible if such policy has a
455 strategy underpinned by the rationale of addressing grand societal challenges. The structuration
456 process mediated by innovation is likely to be lengthy and conflictive. Examples and models of
457 action showing that institutional and regulatory innovation link to specific products, services,
458 standards and regulation take several decades are: energy sector (see above and Kern, 2011), the
459 advent and deployment of the Eurocodes standards in the construction sector still going on after
460 40 years (Johnson, 2009; Nethercot, 2014), sustainable water infrastructures (Daniell *et al.*, 2014)
461 and REACH in the chemical sector (Williams *et al.*, 2009).

462

463 Despite the above the process of global innovation networks structuration mediated and
464 targeting grand societal challenges is not only feasible but necessary. Is *feasible* due to the fact
465 that "demand driven innovation" creates its own consensus and likely to create new markets
466 with lesser political and economic resistance in industry and major trading partners. Is *necessary*
467 because facing the societal challenges requires the interoperability of several technology
468 streams, many stakeholders in a given value network that can well cut across sectors and
469 countries. Systems integration aiming to tackle any of the grand human challenges via markets
470 creation has implicit a number of tensions. These tensions may arise from a number of aspect

⁴ See *For a European Industrial Renaissance*, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (European Commission, 2014).

471 including for example: i) between the need for interoperability between many different firms and
472 the need to invest resources to create value and share (or capture) revenues; 2) between what
473 goals are to be followed and optimised and who dominates in power asymmetries to set goals
474 and hierarchies, etc. Attempts to conduct systems integration in a top down hierarchical form is
475 likely to generate conflict. This is specially the case when there is the need to set a common
476 target to optimise. Here the kind of integration dynamic required is one with highly democratic
477 characteristics. This would be likely a situation where actors have power asymmetries for
478 decision making. Any kind implementation programme requiring intervention at different
479 sectors and geographical jurisdictions with an implicit need to coordinate towards a common
480 goal will require a great deal of disambiguation (Mandi and Sievers, 2014). Seeking and
481 implementing standards and protocols will be a critical requirement.

482

483 It is very likely that the restructuring of global innovation networks will benefit most those
484 promoting it. The process will require the creation of new institutions that apply regulations and
485 standards across industry and nations. Those (firms or countries) managing to succeed on setting
486 the new standards and adapt or create their institutions according the new business models
487 required by the new rationale of bringing solutions to the grand societal challenges are likely to
488 be best positioned in the restructured regional or global value networks. At the core of the
489 governance of global value chains are the business models exerted by the participants in them. In
490 this sense the creation of new business models and systems integration are at the core of future
491 global innovation networks structuration. If European innovation policy is to play any significant
492 role to face the grand challenges ideally the guiding rationale must be the common good and the
493 avoidance of the Tragedy of the Commons (see Hardin, 1968).

494

495 **7. References**

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611 **Vitae**

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